

Runtime Security Lab

Michael Schwarz

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Security Week Graz 2019





Large IoT Incidents

September 21, 2016

> 600 Gbps on Brian Krebs (security researcher) website (Mirai botnet)

- September 30, 2016
 Mirai source code published
- 🔲 October 21, 2016
 - ${}^{\sim}\mathbf{1}\,\mathbf{T}\mathbf{bps}$ on DNS provider Dyn
- November 26, 2016
 - > 900 000 routers of Deutsche Telekom attacked and offline
- 🖬 February, 2018
 - $> 1.35 \, \text{Tbps}$ attack on GitHub



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1. Insecure Web Interface



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Default usernames and passwords



- 1. Insecure Web Interface
- 2. Insecure Network Services



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Unnecessary ports open

- 1. Insecure Web Interface
- 2. Insecure Network Services
- 3. Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces



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Encryption is not available



- 1. Insecure Web Interface
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- 4. Lack of Secure Update Mechanism



Updates are not signed



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- 5. Insecure or Outdated Components



Software with security vulnerabilities



- 1. Insecure Web Interface
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- 6. Insufficient Privacy Protection



Collected information not properly protected



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- 6. Insufficient Privacy Protection
- 7. Insecure Data Transfer and Storage



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- 7. Insecure Data Transfer and Storage
- 8. Lack of Device Management



No device monitoring



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- 9. Insecure Default Settings



Everything runs as root



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- 9. Insecure Default Settings
- 10. Lack of Physical Hardening



Unnecessary external ports like USB





The 90s called...





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...they want their bugs back!





• There are 19 challenges



- There are 19 challenges
- Different difficulties (the more points, the harder)



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- Different difficulties (the more points, the harder)
- 4 different categories



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- Different difficulties (the more points, the harder)
- 4 different categories
- Play on your own or as team

https://ctf.attacking.systems

Challenges

binary			
Warmup	Math Quirks	Too Many Constraints	Secure PIN
10	30	40	40
License Check	License Check II	JIT Math	
40	50	80	
crypto			
Decoder	Crypto Library	loT Endpoint	Crypto Misus
30	40	50	60
misc			
RTFM	2048	Retro Games	Who wants to be a 50
5	30	50	
formats			
Deep Sea	IrConfig	Alien Noises	Device Updat
20	40	40	50

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• Capture-the-flag (CTF) style



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- Every challenge has a hidden flag
- Flags are usually in a text file flag.txt on the device
- A flag looks like CTF{A_S4MPL3_FL4G!}
- Goal is to get the flag and submit it to the CTF system



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Timeline





• CTF runs until Friday, 11:59am



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- Last-minute questions from 11:00am to 11:59am



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- Last-minute questions from 11:00am to 11:59am
- Best player/team gets a price

 Use your own computer or our provided Linux VM (on USB or from https://ctf.attacking.systems/rtfm)





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- Create or join a team in the CTF system: https://ctf.attacking.systems
- Choose a hacklet, read the description, and download it




- Use your own computer or our provided Linux VM (on USB or from https://ctf.attacking.systems/rtfm)
- Create or join a team in the CTF system: https://ctf.attacking.systems
- Choose a hacklet, read the description, and download it
- Solve the hacklet, submit the flag in the CTF system



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
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• Some hacklets are accessible over the network



How to Connect

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- These hacklets have a text interface on a specific port




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PuTTY

How to Connect

- 🔹 Terminal, netcat, telnet
- ∆ netcat, telnet



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- For example on Linux/Mac in the shell: netcat hacklets2.attacking.systems 8000

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There are 4 categories: binary (🐯), crypto (🔊), formats (), misc ()

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WW Vulnerable/insecure binaries which you have to exploit

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Understanding custom formats

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🚟 Vulnerable/insecure binaries which you have to exploit

- [∞] Bad/Misused cryptography you have to break
- Understanding custom formats
- Random and fun hacklets which do not fit into any category (often no programming required)



• Download the hacklet



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- Identify the type of file
 - Executable? For which platform?
 - Data? Which program can open it?
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- Identify the type of file
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- Useful Linux tool: file determines the file type



• Maybe file is some archive...



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- ...or contains multiple files



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• Can also extract files

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• Run strings on the file to extract all texts





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- For binaries: see all functions/variables (*i.e.*, symbols)
 - x86: objdump -x <hacklet>
 - ARM: arm-linux-gnueabi-objdump -x <hacklet>



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- Watch out for function names containing flag





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Binaries

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- ARM: requires

libc6-dev-armhf-cross qemu-system-arm qemu-user



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or for ARMv8

qemu-aarch64 -L /usr/aarch64-linux-gnu ./hacklet



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- Use a network monitor (Wireshark) to detect connections



- Command-line disassembler
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 - All platforms: radare2
- Watch out for dangerous functions (e.g. strcpy, gets)
- GUI disassembler: cutter
 - ${\ensuremath{\mathbf{\Omega}}}$ https://github.com/radareorg/cutter





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- GUI decompiler: Ghidra
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- Open source, supports many architectures



• It helps to explain what you see



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Rubberduck Debugging

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- Talking about the problem can be the first step



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- Usually we talk to humans
- If none available/interested: use a rubber duck!



• Let's start with the challenges!



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- If you are unsure, there is a walkthrough of one hacklet: https://ctf.attacking.systems/rtfm

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What next?

- Let's start with the challenges!
- https://ctf.attacking.systems
- If you are unsure, there is a walkthrough of one hacklet: https://ctf.attacking.systems/rtfm
- Additionally: Slides from our lecture "Security Aspects in Software Development" https://teaching.iaik.tugraz.at/sase/slides



A Challenge a Day Keeps the Boredom Away

Questions?